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 Abstract 
We use data from REPONSE 2004 and WERS 2004 to analyse whether 
approaches to HRM differ according to whether an establishment is part of a 
company with a stock exchange listing.  In both countries we find that listing is 
positively associated with teamworking and performance-related pay, while in 
France, but not in Britain, it is also linked to worker autonomy and training.  
Our findings are inconsistent with the claim that shareholder pressure operates 
as a constraint on the adoption of high-performance workplace practices.  The 
pattern is similar in the two countries, but with a slightly stronger tendency for 
listing to be associated with high-performance workplace practices in France. 
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1. Introduction 
Until recently, little attention was paid to the implications of corporate 
governance for employment relations.  Research carried out in the industrial 
relations tradition focused on the workplace or, more rarely, the enterprise or 
firm, without much regard for the legal or financial structure of the 
organizations which were being studied.  This began to change when, in the 
1980s, waves of privatizations saw state-owned enterprises in many countries 
converted into private-sector companies with stock market listings.  In the same 
period, financial pressures on firms increased and reorganizations and 
restructurings, in many cases triggered by hostile takeovers, became 
commonplace, particularly in Britain and America (O’Sullivan 2000: 188-204).  
The rise of corporate governance codes and associated regulatory changes 
stressed the idea that managers of listed companies should be accountable to 
their shareholders (Thomsen 2006).  By the end of the 1990s certain 
commentators had identified a ‘normative consensus’ in favour of the idea that 
managers should act exclusively in shareholders’ financial interests, the so-
called ‘shareholder value’ or ‘shareholder primacy’ norm (Hansmann and 
Kraakman 2001).  Corporate governance was now understood to be one of the 
major forces reshaping organisations, with repercussions for the employment 
relationship (Blair and Roe 1999; Gospel and Pendleton 2005).   
 
Corporate governance codes and hostile takeovers focus attention on the listed 
company, but this is only one of numerous forms which exist to give legal 
expression to the rights and expectations of those providing inputs into 
organizations.  Others in the private sector include privately-held or ‘closed’ 
corporations, mutuals, cooperatives, partnerships and charities.  Thus a first 
issue to consider in assessing the significance of corporate governance for 
employment relations is whether these differences in legal form – and in 
particular, the presence of a stock market listing – make a difference to the way 
labour is managed across firms.   
 
A second basis for variation in the link between corporate governance and 
employment relations derives from cross-national differences in the wider 
context in which listed companies operate.  The norms governing listed 
companies may be distinct from those affecting other firms, but they are not 
uniform across national systems.  Ownership structures and the degree of capital 
market liquidity also differ. Global convergence of corporate governance 
standards is taking place, with aspects of British and American practice 
spreading to coordinated market systems such as those of France, Germany and 
Japan, along with a rise in overseas share ownership and in the volume of stock 
market activity (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004).  However, a degree of 
diversity across systems remains, in part thanks to the path-dependent nature of 
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laws and regulations governing the business enterprise (Ahlering and Deakin 
2007).  Thus a second issue to consider is whether companies with the same 
legal form – listed companies, in particular – behave differently with regard to 
their employees in different national contexts.  
 
Progress on answering these questions empirically has so far been largely 
confined to cases studies and other qualitative research findings which, while 
suggestive, offer results which are difficult to generalise from.  An alternative 
source of evidence is provided by large-scale surveys of establishment-level 
workplace practices.  For Britain, the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
of 2004 (WERS 2004) includes, for the first time in the history of the survey, a 
question which identifies listed companies separately from other corporate 
governance categories.  For France, the 2004 Relations Professionnelles et 
Négociations d’Entreprise survey (REPONSE 2004) also identifies workplaces 
by reference to the corporate governance form of the relevant employing 
organisation, with listed companies specifically identifiable.  The questionnaires 
on which the datasets are based are not identical but there are certain structural 
similarities; REPONSE has, to a large degree, been modeled on WERS.  The 
conclusion of the fifth WERS survey in 2004 provides an opportunity to place 
analysis of WERS in the context of findings of the most recent wave of 
REPONSE which was carried out in 2004-5. 
 
The paper is ordered as follows.  Part 2 sets out in greater detail the relevant 
features of the corporate governance forms under consideration here and 
discusses, at a conceptual level, some of the bases on which those forms might 
be expected to influence human resource management practices.  Part 3 
provides an overview of relevant features of the British and French systems of 
corporate governance and employment regulation, with the aim of identifying 
the respects in which they differ and the implications this might have for the 
relationship between corporate governance and employment relations.  Part 4 
describes the methods employed in the research, explains the basis on which the 
two datasets were used to explore issues relating to the corporate 
governance/employment interface, and presents the findings.  Part 5 concludes. 
 
2. The implications of corporate governance form for employment relations 
and HRM 
Corporate governance may be narrowly defined as concerned with ‘the ways in 
which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investments’ (Shleifer and Vishny 1997: 737).  But even among 
financial economists there is a recognition that others, including employees, 
suppliers, customers and communities, are affected by managerial decision 
making. This perspective leads Tirole – ‘unconventionally for an economist’ (as 
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he puts it) – to define corporate governance as ‘the design of institutions that 
induce or force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders’ as a 
whole (Tirole 2001: 4).  Writing from an industrial relations perspective, Gospel 
and Pendleton (2005: 3) argue for a similarly broad definition: ‘corporate 
governance is about the relationship between three sets of actors or stakeholders 
– capital, management and labour’.  The way in which the firm is financed can 
be expected to ‘provide a set of constraints and opportunities which influence 
managerial choices, including in the labour area’ (Gospel and Pendleton 2005: 
4).  They therefore suggest that it is necessary to take into account the role of 
corporate ownership and patterns of financing alongside the strategic choices 
made by management when considering the ‘influence which capital and 
management have on labour and the systems of labour management which are 
put in place’ (Gospel and Pendleton 2005: 5). 
 
The starting point in analyzing corporate governance is the legal form of the 
business enterprise.  This is because company law provides several different 
forms that give rise to distinctive ownership and governance structures.  In 
modern market economies, the most basic and widely used legal form is that of 
the company limited by share capital.  Its essential attributes derive from its 
juridical nature, and include separate corporate personality, limited liability for 
shareholders, and the delegation of authority from the shareholders to 
management via the board of directors.  In virtually all national systems, the 
category of the limited company subdivides into two mutually exclusive groups: 
‘public limited’ or more simply, ‘public’ companies (the British ‘plc’, German 
‘AG’ or French ‘SA’), and ‘private’ companies, in some jurisdictions called 
‘private limited companies’ or ‘limited liability companies’ (the equivalent in 
France is the ‘SARL’ and in Germany the ‘GmbH’).  Public limited companies 
are legally authorised to sell their shares to the public at large and, to that end, 
to obtain a listing or quotation on a stock exchange, whereas private companies 
are, for the most part, barred from raising capital from the general public in this 
way.  Public limited companies, because they have greater access to external 
capital, are suitable for large and well-established enterprises, while private 
companies are most often used for start-ups and family-owned firms.  However, 
this link is by no means inevitable.  The public company form can be used for 
enterprises with small numbers of employees – many systems have a minimum 
capital threshold, but not an employment threshold, for the public company 
form – while many large private-sector firms are not listed (this is the case, for 
example, with companies which are financed through leveraged debt or, as it 
has recently come to be known, ‘private equity’). 
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In what ways are listed companies distinct from other forms?  Firstly, 
ownership structures differ.  The shares of a listed company can be bought and 
sold on a public market and ownership can thereby come to rest, in whole or in 
part, with ‘external’ or ‘remote’ shareholders whose connection to the firm is 
purely financial.  In practice, established companies (as opposed to start-ups) 
rarely seek finance through a public offering; their shareholders will largely 
consist of individuals or institutions (unit trusts or pensions funds) who have 
purchased their holdings on the secondary market without making a direct 
contribution of capital to the firm.  However, the possibility of raising capital in 
this way gives a listed company flexibility in responding to its future needs that 
other corporate forms do not have, and can be viewed as providing it with a 
superior risk-bearing capacity, in particular in systems with highly liquid capital 
markets and a tendency for the ownership of listed companies to be dispersed 
across a large number of holdings (Carlin and Mayer 2003). 
 
Listed companies also have distinctive governance structures.  Modern finance 
theory sees external shareholders as having a vital role in ensuring good 
governance (Fama 1980).  The capital market is viewed as an information-
processing mechanism through which the performance of firms, and their 
managers, is continuously (and, it is claimed, efficiently) being assessed.  
External shareholders ensure that managers are held to account while, in a wider 
sense, the capital market provides a benchmark against which the performance 
of firms can be effectively evaluated.  A capital market with a high degree of 
liquidity also provides shareholders with a low-cost exit option, facilitating risk 
spreading by them. 
 
By contrast to the features of listed companies just described, certain other 
corporate governance forms – private companies, mutuals and cooperatives – 
share a model of insider-orientated governance which has the following three 
linked features: restricted exit options, a long-term time horizon for investments 
(whether of labour or finance), and the restriction of voice and voting rights to a 
semi-closed class of stakeholders (‘insider’ shareholders such as family 
members and/or founders in the case of private companies, customers in the 
case of mutuals, and employees in the case of cooperatives: see Hansmann 
1996).  External finance comes mainly in the form of debt which does not 
confer the privileges of membership on the lender.  Non-listed public companies 
and private companies are closer to this insider-orientated form of governance 
than they are to the model of external ownership associated with listed 
companies. In their case, even if there are no a priori restrictions on exit, the 
absence of an organized market in which the shares can be traded limits the de 
facto ability of shareholders to quit the firm.  Secondly, as corporate 
management and strategy are not assessed by the stock market, share prices 
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cannot be used as a metric for corporate performance and so cannot be 
deployed, to the same extent, as an incentive device.  Taken together, these 
characteristics extend the time horizon for investments and give managers 
greater autonomy from external capital market controls than is the case with 
listed companies.  The leveraged buyout, in which a listed company is 
temporarily taken private and its share capital replaced with debt, illustrates the 
point: one of the governance advantages, in principle, of this form of private 
equity is the greater freedom managers have to implement long-term strategic 
goals, although empirical evidence on this point is not clear-cut (see Wright et 
al. 2006). 
 
How would we expect these different corporate governance forms to influence 
the approach which management takes to relations with employees?  
Shareholder value-based management models, which began to be widely 
adopted by listed companies during the 1990s (Froud et al. 2000a and 2000b; 
Cooper, Crowther, Davies and Davis 2000; Hossfeld and Klee 2003), express 
most clearly the logic of the financial requirements imposed on firms by stock 
markets. These models are all founded on the following principle: there is 
‘creation of shareholder value’ when the financial profitability achieved by the 
firm (as measured by the return on equity, that is, the ratio of net profits to the 
book value of equity capital) is higher than the rate of profitability expected by 
the market (which in turn determines the cost of equity capital for the firm). 
Corporate executives are required to maximise shareholder value in each 
financial period; this is the basis for increases in the firm’s share price.  By 
contrast, any ‘destruction’ of shareholder value (which occurs even where there 
is positive financial profitability, but returns are below the cost of capital) runs 
the risk of triggering a fall in the company’s shares.  Labour costs are the main 
component of operating costs.  As such, they are the element which can be most 
directly leveraged with a view to increasing net profits, for a given level of total 
turnover.  As a result, shareholder value-based approaches can lead to a cost-
cutting approach to human resource management (‘HRM’) (Hutton 1995; Porter 
1997).  More specifically, they constrain the capacity of management to enter 
into partnership-type arrangements with employees, while they, in turn, will be 
less willing to invest in firm-specific human capital (Blair 1995; Armour and 
Deakin 2003).   
 
Support for this ‘constraint hypothesis’ comes from qualitative case studies.  
One strand in the literature, taking an historical approach, has shown that 
managers in listed companies enjoy less autonomy with regard to external 
financial pressures, mediated through the corporate governance system, than 
they did a generation ago.  The American and British systems, in particular, 
underwent a significant shift towards the empowerment of shareholders, or, 
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more precisely, of capital markets, beginning in the 1970s and gathering pace 
after that, as a result of the rise of the hostile takeover bid and the associated 
‘market for corporate control’ (Jacoby 2005).  The operation of the market for 
corporate control in these systems has led managers in listed companies to 
prioritise dividend payouts, share price increases and share buy-backs which 
return capital directly to shareholders, over ‘implicit contracts’ or distributional 
compromises with employees designed to elicit their loyalty and commitment 
(Shleifer and Summers 1988; Deakin, Hobbs, Nash and Slinger 2003).  There is 
evidence that this has impacted on HRM in a number of ways: a lower degree of 
engagement between managers and employees over workplace change; less 
autonomy for employees in relation to job design and work organization; and a 
greater use of individualized incentives, including financial ones (Gospel and 
Pendleton 2005: 14-17).   
 
A complementary set of studies has looked at macroeconomic evidence on the 
implications of dispersed ownership and high levels of capital market liquidity 
for labour.  The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach emphasizes the role of 
institutional complementarities between capital market and labour market 
structures (Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable, Ernst and Palombarini 2005; 
Goergen, Brewster and Wood 2006).  The key idea here is that a financial 
system which favours liquidity thereby facilitates corporate restructuring, but at 
the cost of employee commitment to the firm.  On this basis, we would expect 
dispersed ownership and high levels of capital market liquidity to be associated 
with low job tenure and low levels of investment in firm-specific human capital.  
Black, Gospel and Pendleton (2007) provide a first systematic empirical 
analysis of these issues in a comparative, cross-sectional study of OECD 
countries.  As a proxy for external shareholder pressure they use two variables: 
a measure of trading activity and new stock issues over a 3-year period and the 
ratio of the number of mergers and acquisitions deals to population.  They 
control for the unemployment rate and trade union density. They find a negative 
effect of market liquidity on job tenure but they observe no relationship between 
stock market liquidity and training. The idea of a cost-cutting approach to HRM 
stemming from financial market pressures is thereby only partially confirmed. 
 
Some micro-level, enterprise-based studies also produce complex and 
ambiguous results, not necessarily pointing in the direction of the ‘constraint 
hypothesis’.  Case studies of UK-based utilities and manufacturing companies 
with stock exchange listings, carried out in two phases in the mid-1990s and 
early 2000s, suggest that while shareholder pressure was a significant constraint 
on labour-management cooperation in some cases during this period, in other 
cases managers were able to develop, with union support, a strategy that 
persuaded shareholders to take a long-term view of their investments, creating 
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space for partnerships with labour (Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelman and Wilkinson 
2002; 2006).  Sector-specific factors, including regulation of the quality of 
services and protection of consumer interests in the case of the utilities, were 
found to play a role in extending time horizons, as did the intensity and nature 
of product market competition (in particular whether it was price- or quality-
orientated) as well as the particular trajectories of individual firms.  In the 
manufacturing context, the absence of pressures for partnership stemming from 
sector-specific regulation of the kind observed in the utilities, coupled with 
intense competitive pressures, made partnership arrangements particularly 
fragile in the sample of firms studied here. 
 
Jackson, Höpner and Kurdelbusch (2005) found that German firms subject to 
increased shareholder pressures had a tendency to shed labour and fall back on a 
core of stable employees, although on the whole without resorting to mass 
dismissals, instead using voluntary redundancies and early retirement.  Within 
such companies, average wage levels tended to rise, while the use of individual 
and collective bonuses was becoming more widespread. The strong 
institutionalisation of worker involvement in German companies, through 
collective bargaining and codetermination rights (for work councils and at the 
board-level), had survived the transformation of corporate governance towards a 
more market-based system. Codetermination had facilitated corporate 
restructuring, in a way that had benefited the core workforce: the evolution of 
codetermination toward an insider-oriented, efficiency-driven model was not 
inconsistent with the need for high financial returns which is part and parcel of a 
more liquid stock market system. 
 
In the French case, an empirical analysis of the REPONSE 2004 survey by 
Perraudin, Petit and Rebérioux (2008) has yielded somewhat similar results. 
First, compared to other firms, listed companies were found to make greater use 
of individual bonuses for managerial employees and collective bonuses for all 
employees.  This effect was strengthened by the presence of institutional 
investors. Listing was also positively linked to higher levels of expenditure on 
training and to higher mean and median wages. 
 
The studies carried out by Deakin et al. (2006), Jackson et al. (2005) and 
Perraudin et al. (2008) reveal a somewhat different picture than that implied by 
the idea of a corporate governance constraint.  There is the possibility of a 
scenario in which shareholders’ requirements for financial returns can be met on 
the basis of a long-term time horizon, with management and labour making 
mutually specialised investments in skills, know-how, work design and related 
aspect of the production process.  In other words, employers may respond to 
stock market pressure through the implementation of worker commitment 
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devices (Konzelmann et al., 2006). This may, in particular, induce the use of 
performance-related pay (PRP), either individual or collective. This is because 
these forms of remuneration provide a means of aligning worker interests with 
the financial performance of the firm, as well as making labour costs more 
flexible in the event of a downturn. 
 
To sum up this part: the literature on the relationship between corporate 
governance and employment relations has generated, to date, no clear-cut 
conclusion on the likely effect of ownership form on HRM.  Instead, two 
distinct possibilities emerge. The first, which we have called the constraint 
hypothesis, suggests that shareholder pressure constrains the extent to which 
management can practise cooperative forms of HRM. The second, which we 
may call the partnership hypothesis, predicts that shareholder pressure need not 
result in a zero-sum game: under certain conditions, managers can continue to 
make implicit contracts with workers in return for high performance and 
willingness to undertake firm-specific training. Both alternatives are plausible at 
a theoretical level and it remains for empirical research to establish how far one 
or the other may be observed in practice.  
 
3. Cross-national differences in the institutional framework, ownership 
structure and stock market liquidity: Britain and France compared 
Our analysis so far has produced a number of reasons to believe that corporate 
governance form – and in particular, the presence of a stock market listing – 
may influence HRM.  Listed companies are subject to a set of unique pressures, 
some market-based and some originating in law and regulation.  In this section 
we explore a related question: how far would be we expect those pressures to 
differ according to the national context which is being considered?   More 
specifically, with regard to a comparison of findings from WERS and 
REPONSE, what are the differences between Britain and France which might 
be expected to mediate the effects of a stock market listing? 
 
In the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, families of ‘liberal market’ and 
‘coordinated market’ systems are identified, into which the British and French 
cases, respectively, are generally thought to fall (Hall and Soskice 2001). 
However, there are significant respects in which they do not conform 
straightforwardly to these paradigms, and account must be taken of recent 
changes within the two countries which further complicate the picture. 
 
For present purposes, three critical dimensions of cross-national differences are 
the legal-institutional regime, the structure of ownership prevailing in listed 
companies, and the extent of capital market liquidity.  In each of these respects, 
Britain looks like a standard ‘Anglo-American’ system in which the 
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predominant mode of ownership is mainly through the holdings of institutional 
investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and unit trusts.  Although 
institutional investors provide a degree of collectivized ownership, on the whole 
they actively strive to diversify their holdings in order to spread risk.  As a 
result, they frequently lack strong ties to particular companies and they rarely 
engage directly or openly with corporate management, although there is 
evidence that this practice is growing in importance thanks to the interventions 
of ‘focus funds’ and activist hedge funds (Becht, Franks, Mayer and Rossi 
2007).  For the most part, an active market for corporate control, coupled with 
executive share options and other individualized incentives schemes, serves to 
align managers’ interests with those of shareholders.  Rules relating to 
disclosure of investment information and the prohibition of insider dealing help 
to maintain a high degree of stock market liquidity, while the Takeover Code 
underpins the market for corporate control (Armour, Deakin and Konzelmann 
2003; Armour and Skeel 2007).  
 
France, on the other hand, is a system in which share ownership is relatively 
concentrated by international standards, as a result of continuing cross-
shareholdings among listed companies and the legacy of state ownership of and 
influence over large industrial and financial enterprises.  More generally, the 
concept of shareholder primacy enjoys no obvious legitimacy in France.  On the 
contrary: the prevailing legal conception of the firm is based on the idea that 
managers serve the ‘company interest’ over and above those of the shareholders 
or of any other corporate constituency (Aglietta and Rebérioux 2005: 41-45 and 
58-59). 
 
However, French company law has also seen far-reaching changes in the 
direction of strengthening shareholder rights in recent years (see Lele and Siems 
2007).  The ‘New Economic Regulation’ of 2001 and the Financial Security Act 
of 2003 were designed to protect the position of minority investors and to 
enhance information flows to the general body of shareholders.  Since the mid 
1990s, capital market laws have been progressively transformed, largely along 
the lines of the financial disclosure requirements of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) model.   
 
Figure 1, which is based on Lele and Siems (2007), illustrates the extent of 
formal convergence between the company law rules of the two countries, and 
puts it into a broader comparative context.  It provides a measurement of change 
in the rules of company law and securities law affecting listed companies, 
including those set out in corporate governance and takeover codes.  A higher 
score on the index indicates a greater degree of legal protection for shareholder 
interests.  For much of the period covered by the index, and in particular since 
 10 
the mid-1990s, French law has provided stronger shareholder protection than 
US law, and has been roughly comparable to UK law.  The laws of all the 
countries covered in the Lele-Siems index – France, Germany, India, the US 
and the UK – have been moving in broadly the same direction of greater rights 
for shareholders, largely as a result of the international diffusion of the 
corporate governance code model, and, in the case of the European systems, of 
the harmonisation of company laws within the EU. 
 
Source: Lele and Siems (2007) 
 
In parallel with this change in French law, has been a substantial erosion of the 
traditional cross-shareholding system, encouraged by government and by the 
decision of several large insurance companies to break up their holdings (Goyer 
and Hancké 2005).  Although cross-shareholdings between major non-financial 
companies are still far more prevalent than in the Anglo-Saxon systems 
(Thomsen 2004: 306-308), there has been a considerable increase in 
institutional investors, national (mainly mutual funds) and foreign (mainly US 
and UK pension and mutual funds). By the end of 2003, non-resident investors 
owned 43.9% of the outstanding share of CAC40 companies and almost 35% of 
the shares of all listed companies.  In the UK, there has also been a significant 
recent change, with the proportion of foreign ownership increasing rapidly since 
the mid-1990s.  Table 1 presents the distribution of ownership for British, 
French and German listed companies in 2002.  It shows that, to some extent, the 
structure of share ownership in France is now closer to the British case than to 
the German one.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Shareholder protection in 5 countries 
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Table 1: Ownership of common stock (as a % of outstanding shares) for listed 
companies in Britain, France and Germany, 2002 
 
 UK France Germany 
Households 14.3 6.5 22.9 
Non-financial companies 0.8 20.2 11.7 
Government 0.1 3.6 1.9 
Banks 12.6 12.6 33.5 
Institutional investors (pension 
funds, mutual funds and 
insurance companies) 
 
40.0 
 
26.0 
 
12 
Foreign 32.1 31.2 18.1 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Tirole (2006:37). 
 
A similar pattern may be observed in relation to measures of stock market 
activity (see Figure 2).  Since the end of the 1990s, the French level of stock 
market capitalisation is relatively greater than the German one, representing 
more than 100% of the GDP in 2006, against 53% in Germany.  From Table 2 it 
can be seen that this is not due to a rise in the number of listed companies; 
rather, it is caused by an increase in the volume of transactions, which in turn is 
related to the diminishing importance of cross-shareholdings and to the growing 
role played by institutional and foreign investors.  
 
At the same time, Figure 2 and Table 2 also make it clear that the level of stock 
market liquidity (measured by the extent of stock market capitalisation and the 
number of listed companies) is still significantly greater in the UK than in either 
France or Germany.  In addition, and notwithstanding regulatory convergence, 
important differences remain at the level of the institutional framework.  Under 
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, takeover defences, such as US-style 
‘poison pills’ which deter potential bidders (see Deakin, Hobbs, Nash and 
Slinger 2003), are hardly ever put in place prior to a bid.  The principle of one-
share, one-vote is not a legal rule, but is recommended by principles issued by 
the investment industry, and is widely followed.  In France, by contrast, 
legislation implementing the EU Thirteenth Company Law Directive in March 
2006 allowed the board of directors to issue warrants providing the right to new 
stock to existing shareholders in the face of a hostile takeover bid, subject only 
to majority shareholder approval at an ordinary meeting.  This provides a 
powerful defence against hostile takeover bids (Shearman & Sterling LLP 
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2006); and in a point of difference from British practice, the principle of one-
share, one-vote is still not recognised by most large listed companies in France, 
diluting minority shareholder influence and providing managers with a 
significant level of protection from the market for corporate control. 
 
Figure 2 : Stock market capitalisation as a % of GDP in three 
countries, 1991-2006
0
50
100
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200
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France
UK
Germany
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Table 2: Numbers of listed companies in the UK, France and  Germany, 1995-2006 
 
 London 
Stock 
Exchange 
Euronext 
Paris 
Deustche 
Börse 
1998 2423 962 662 
1999 2274 969 851 
2000 2374 966 983 
2001 2332 936 983 
2002 2824 873 934 
2003 2692 817 866 
2004 2837 787 819 
2005 3091 749 764 
2006 3256 730 760 
Source: FIBV, AMF. 
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It is also important to take into account not just company law, but 
complementary forms of regulation which affect the business enterprise.  For 
the purposes which we are considering, namely the relationship between 
corporate governance and employment relations, the most important of these is 
labour or employment law.  Here France occupies a middle position between 
the Anglo-American systems and the more strongly corporatist, German-
influenced systems.  Codetermination, in the sense of board-level representation 
for workers, does not formally exist in French law: two members of the comité 
d’entreprise, or enterprise committee, may take part in meetings of the board of 
directors (or supervisory board), but without voting rights.  A two-tier board 
structure similar to the German model is an option for listed companies, but 
very few take it up.  Moreover, the French enterprise committee is a very 
different institution from the German works council, not least because the 
French model contains representatives of both workers and managers and is 
chaired by a representative of the employer. 
 
Union influence within the workplace in France is limited and is, moreover, a 
comparatively recent development, having been encouraged in legal reforms of 
the 1980s; the enforcement of employers’ legal obligations depends on active 
state intervention, through the labour inspectorate and judicial intervention, to a 
much greater degree in France than in either Germany or Britain (Supiot 1994).  
Conversely, the French model of employment protection law offers significantly 
stronger legal guarantees of job security than the British one.  While British 
unfair dismissal law is largely procedural in nature and provides only weak 
sanctions, with a growing preference for disputes to be resolved internally, 
French law confers substantive rights with tougher sanctions, a contrast which is 
reflected in the relative position of the two countries in cross-national indices 
measuring the strength of labour law protections (see Botero et al. 2004; OECD 
2004; Deakin, Lele and Siems 2007).   
 
Figure 3 indicates that in the area of labour regulation, there has been only 
limited convergence between Britain and France in recent years, and that they 
remain far apart in a broader international context.  This Figure is based on the 
leximetric index prepared by Deakin, Lele and Siems (2007) and employs the 
same methodology as the company law index described in Figure 1, making a 
broad comparison possible.  UK labour law protection has been strengthening 
since the mid-1990s, in part thanks to changes in the law of employee 
representation associated with the implementation of EU directives concerning 
information and consultation rights.  Although there is no veto right and no 
‘status quo clause’ requiring the unravelling of corporate restructurings if these 
obligations are not met, legal sanctions for breach of the relevant rules have 
been tightened in recent years and, in finely balanced cases, can alter the 
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outcome of commercial negotiations, with implication for job security (Armour 
and Deakin 2003).  The UK regime on takeover bids will also, in future, be 
affected by requirements to take into account employee interests.  As part of the 
steps taken to implement the Thirteenth Company Law Directive in the UK, 
bidder and target companies subject to UK law now have to disclose in detail 
their plans for future restructurings or redundancies, a step which is likely to 
open up new opportunities for employee representatives to bring influence to 
bear on the takeover process, as they do on the continent (Deakin 2007). A 
further step towards strengthening employee voice is the recent implementation 
in the UK of the EU Information and Consultation Directive, although as yet its 
influence is limited (Hall 2006). 
 
Source: Deakin, Lele and Siems (2007) 
 
To sum up this part: the British system is one in which the regulatory 
framework, the prevailing structure of ownership and the level of stock market 
liquidity each favour a shareholder-based conception of the publicly-held 
corporation.  Managers of listed companies see their role as returning value to 
shareholders in a context where restructurings, triggered by hostile takeovers, or 
the threat of them, are a principal means by which this is achieved.  To some 
degree this is counter-balanced by labour regulation, in particular the growing 
institutionalisation of employee voice within the firm.  In France, the system 
cannot be described as anti-shareholder or pro-employee as such, and, indeed, 
legal protections for shareholders are much more significant than they were just 
a decade ago.  However, managers are still seen as responsible for maintaining 
the organisational entity of the firm, thereby serving the interests of a range of 
interested parties.  Shareholders are included in this group but they do not have 
priority.  Thanks in part to the law, to the continuing (if declining) influence of 
Figure 3: Labour regulation in 5 countries 1970-2005
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a technocratic culture among senior managers, and to the government’s 
insistence on the need to protect the French corporate sector against what are 
seen as predatory overseas interests, the market for corporate control is a far less 
potent influence in France than it is in Britain.  Employees have strongly 
institutionalised voice rights which the legal system backs up with powerful 
sanctions.  However, as the system of cross-shareholdings begins to unravel and 
overseas investors enter French capital markets, the organisational orientation of 
French companies may be under threat, at least in that segment of the sector 
where dispersed shareholder ownership is becoming the norm. 
 
4. Empirical analysis: corporate governance forms and HRM practices 
We now turn to our empirical analysis.  As we saw in section 2, most of what 
we know about the relationship between corporate governance and HRM is 
based on enterprise-level case studies; they are revealing for the way in which 
corporate governance form appears to be playing an important and growing role 
in shaping managerial strategies with regard to labour, but by their nature they 
can only tell us a certain amount about how listed companies in general behave, 
and how they differ from other corporate governance forms.  The picture they 
present should be tested against more quantitative approaches where this is 
possible.  WERS and REPONSE provide data on workplace-level employment 
practices, with the possibility of differentiating among establishments by 
reference to the corporate governance form of the employing entity (Pendleton 
and Deakin 2007; Perraudin et al. 2008).  Thus we can test whether workplaces 
belonging to listed companies have distinctive human resource management 
practices.   
 
The first step is to identify variables relating to corporate governance form and 
human resource management practices within the framework of WERS and 
REPONSE which are appropriate for our analysis.  WERS is widely 
acknowledged to be the principal source of data on the nature of workplace-
level employment relations in Britain.  Perhaps surprisingly, there have been 
few studies of REPONSE in the Anglophone literature.  First conducted in 
1992, and then again in 1998 and 2004, this survey was devised with reference 
to WERS, by the research centre of the French Ministry of Labour (DARES).  
REPONSE 2004 is based on a sample of 2,930 French establishments with 20 
workers or more. The sample is representative of the French productive sector, 
excluding the agricultural sector and the public sector. The exclusion of the 
public sector is the main point of difference from WERS, which is a 
representative sample of workplaces in Britain in both the private and public 
sectors (2,295 establishments are included in the main, cross-sectional survey of 
managers).  The topics covered are basically the same in WERS and 
REPONSE: labour organisation, workplace changes, job management, worker 
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involvement (information and consultation), pay systems, conflicts, and so on. 
However, the precise questions differ (in part this is the result of the divergence 
of the two surveys over time) and relatively few are identical.  
 
4.1 The corporate governance variables 
Tables 3a and 3b indicate the distribution of establishments across legal forms 
in the two surveys, as well as the proportion of listed entities in each category.   
REPONSE has no establishments belonging to partnerships and self-
proprietorships, nor to the public sector.  In order to have comparable samples, 
we exclude partnerships, self-proprietorships and the public sector from WERS.  
This leaves us with a sample of 1,563 British workplaces, of which 29% belong 
to a listed company, and 2,904 French workplaces, of which 38% belong to 
organisations that are listed.
1
 
 
In the British case, only public limited companies (plcs) can obtain a stock 
exchange listing.  80 per cent of the plcs in WERS are listed.  In France, the 
picture is slightly more complex. 86.7 percent of workplaces in REPONSE are 
recorded as relating to a société commerciale (business company).  This is a 
statistical, not legal, category, which groups together the British plc and private 
limited company.  48.3 percent of the sociétés commerciales in REPONSE are 
listed: for the vast majority, these are ‘sociétés anonymes’ (SA), the equivalent 
of the British plc.  In the same way that the plc is the legal vehicle for becoming 
a listed or quoted company in Britain, the SA is by far the most popular route to 
a listing in France. Yet is possible to find one (small) other sub-category of 
société commerciale that might qualify for a stock exchange listing, namely the 
société en commandite (a structure which, in the terms used by English law, 
combines elements of the company limited by share capital with those of the 
partnership).  In addition, some companies belonging to a further category, 
‘other company with legal personality’, can be listed, although these are very 
cases of this.   
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Table 3a: Legal form and stock exchange listing in WERS 2004 
 
 Frequency (and 
percentage) 
% of which are 
listed 
1. Public limited company 565  (36.1%) 80% 
2. Private limited company 794  (50.8%) none 
3. Company limited by guarantee 55  (3.5%) none 
5. Trust / Charity 92  (5.9%) none 
6. Body established by Royal Charter 33  (2.1%) none 
7. Co-operative / Mutual / Friendly society 24  (1.5%) none 
Total 1563  (100%) 29% 
Note: the item ASTATUS asked respondents ‘How would you describe the formal status of this establishment (or 
the organization of which it is part)?’. This was followed by 12 categories. Categories 4 (partnership / self-
proprietorship) and 8-12 (public sector) have been excluded to fit with the REPONSE sample. 
 
 
Table 3b: Legal form and stock exchange listing in REPONSE 2004 
 
 Frequency (and 
percentage) 
% of which are 
listed 
3. Non-resident legal person 6  (0.2%) 66.7% 
4. Administrative law legal person, regulated by 
commercial law 
63  (2.2%) none 
5. “Société commerciale” (business company), 
including in particular “Société  anonyme”, 
“Société en commandite” or SARL 
2541  (87.7%) 42.5% 
6. Other company with legal personality 73  (2.5%) 28.8% 
8. Mutual, union, work council 27  (0.9%) none 
9. Non for profit organization: “Association Loi de 
1901”, “Fondation”, etc. 
189  (6.5%) none 
Total 2904  (100%) 38% 
Note: data on legal form are obtained through the administrative classification of the respondent organisation 
(and not through a direct question as in the case of WERS). The classification refers to the categories used by 
INSEE (the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies). Legal forms 1, 2 and 7 are not included in 
the survey.  It is not possible to break down the definitions further, for example to indicate the numbers of 
‘sociétés anonymes’ or ‘sociétés en commandite’. 
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We confine our present empirical analysis to a comparison of listed companies 
with the rest. This means that a non-listed plc or a non-listed SA is grouped 
together with private limited companies, mutuals, cooperatives, and the rest.  
This is for the reasons set out in section 2 (above): listed companies are subject 
to unique pressures to return value to shareholders which do not apply to non-
listed public companies and private companies, whose shares cannot be publicly 
traded; mutuals and cooperatives have no external shareholders at all.  The 
analysis therefore makes it possible to see directly to what extent HRM 
practices differ according to whether a company is listed, in each of the two 
countries.   
 
Some unavoidable limitations on our study should be noted.  Data on the 
identity of shareholders are available in REPONSE (households, non-financial 
companies, institutional investors, etc.) but not in WERS.
2
  Conversely, 
REPONSE does not provide any information on the degree of dispersion of 
ownership.  Nor can we say anything about private equity forms of corporate 
ownership (such as leveraged buy-outs), which are not visible in our sample.   
 
It should also be noted that is not possible to observe directly the influence of 
specific regulations affecting establishments in general or those of listed 
companies in particular, as there are no questions precisely tailored to this end 
in the two surveys.  Thus the role of the national context in each case can only 
be identified at a more diffuse, aggregate level.  However, the national context 
is not irrelevant in our analysis.  Establishments in WERS are subject to one set 
of national contextual influences, including regulatory ones, and those in 
REPONSE are subject to another one.  It is possible to draw some qualified 
inferences about the role of national conditions, as we shall see. 
 
4.2 The HRM variables 
The choice of HRM practice variables used in the analysis was informed by the 
substantial and growing literature on high performance/high involvement/high 
commitment work systems (HCWS). In this literature, there is no consensus 
about the individual HRM practices or bundles of practices that constitute an 
HCWS (Edwards and Wright 2001, Guest 2001). One branch of the research 
focuses on the effects of individual practices (for example, Dyer and Reeves 
1995, Guest and Hoque 1994) while the other takes more of a ‘systems’ 
approach (for example, Ahmad and Schroeder 2003, Bae and Lawer 2000). 
However, Edwards and Wright’s (2001) assessment of the literature on HCWSs 
suggests that they typically encompass:  
 
‘some combination of: schemes to promote employee discretion 
and autonomy, such as formally designed teamworking, quality 
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circles or problem-solving groups; systems of communication that 
allow for upward communication of employee suggestions as well 
as downward communication from management; and serious 
attention to developing employee skills.  They may … also deploy 
merit or performance based pay and other features of HRM.’ 
(Edwards and Wright 2001: 570) 
 
This conclusion is broadly in line with two of the dominant theories of HRM: 
the ‘resource-based view’ (RBV) and the ‘ability, motivation and opportunity’ 
(AMO) theory. While the RBV emphasizes the contribution that employees’ 
input can make to the organisation’s performance (for example, De la Cruz et 
al. 2003, Wright et al. 2001), the AMO theory argues that organisational 
interests are best served by HRM practices that equip employees with the 
ability, motivation and opportunity to work effectively together (for example, 
Appelbaum et al. 2000, Bailey et al. 2001).  It is also compatible with the 
contingency theory approach to HRM, which stresses the importance of 
contextual factors from the external environment (Ahmad and Schroeder 2003, 
Datta et al. 2005).  In our analysis, the mediating role of regulations in different 
national systems, particularly with respect to the rights associated with 
ownership and the employment relationship, is particularly important. 
 
In the light of the above, we focus on the following variables within WERS and 
REPONSE relating to HRM practices: training, autonomy, team working, 
individual performance-related pay (PRP), collective PRP, and engagement.  
Two aspects of engagement with workers are identified: engagement over 
workplace change, and engagement over performance targets.  Given the 
limitations of both aspects (in particular, they concern only a sub-sample of the 
establishments), we hope to have a better understanding of engagement by 
repeating the empirical analysis on two somewhat different variables.  All of 
these are seen as high commitment HRM practices (Den Hartog and Verburg 
2004, Wright and Gardner 2003, Wright et al. 2005) and they each relate 
directly to the literature, surveyed in section 2 above, which predicts differences 
in the approach to HRM depending on whether a firm has a stock market listing.  
 
Appendix 1, Tables A and B set out in detail the way in which these variables 
were constructed from the two datasets.   As will be seen from these Tables, the 
questions used in WERS and REPONSE are not identical, reflecting different 
emphases in the construction of the particular questions; but it is possible to 
identify equivalent questions across the WERS and REPONSE, as we have 
done. For example, the training variable for REPONSE refers to spending on 
training as a percentage of the total wage bill and that for WERS refers to the 
percentage of employees given training and the number of days of off-the-job 
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training provided. This point leads us to two important methodological choices 
in our empirical strategy: 
 
 First, as pooling the two datasets would require identical items in WERS and 
REPONSE, this was not a feasible option. We therefore run parallel 
regressions for the two countries, with similar control variables.
3
  
 Second, we have based our analysis on profiles indicating the most intensive 
users of the HRM practice concerned, rather than by comparing mean scores 
across the two surveys.  This is done in part to highlight cases of the 
strategic use of the practice concerned.  In addition, a relative measure of the 
take-up of practices makes sense in a context in which direct comparison of 
scores has limited meaning (different scales are used in the two surveys). 
Our econometric strategy is to observe the influence of different factors 
(including listing) on the probability of being among the ‘most intensive 
users’. To identify the most important users, we used two implicit rules. The 
first was to try, whenever we could, to isolate the first quartile of the sample. 
The second was to define, as far as possible, identical thresholds for both 
countries.  
 
Tables 4a and 4b indicate statistical correlations among the HRM practices, for 
Britain and France respectively. Intensive uses of training, team working and 
PRP (both individual and collective) are positively linked to each other in both 
countries. In France, autonomy is associated with training and PRP but not with 
team working or engagement. In Britain, autonomy is associated with training, 
team working and engagement, but not with PRP.  One final comment is that 
the generally small correlations among HR practices suggest no obvious 
empirical basis for creating variables defining HR bundles. Tables 4a and 4b 
also indicate the correlations between stock market listing and HRM practices. 
In both countries, listing is strongly positively correlated with most of those 
practices. This first, descriptive analysis thereby suggests that listed companies 
are not constrained in their use of high commitment HRM practices. However, 
engagement on targets, in France, and autonomy, in Britain, are negatively 
linked to listing. In addition, engagement on change appears to be independent 
of listing in both countries. The econometric analysis will assess the robustness 
of these first results.  
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Table 4a: Correlations between HRM variables and listing for WERS 
 
 Training Autonomy Team 
Working 
Individual 
PRP 
Collective 
PRP 
Engagement: 
Changes 
Engagement: 
Targets 
Training        
Autonomy 0.09***       
Team Working 0.16*** 0.05*      
Individual PRP 0.16*** -0.00 0.01     
Collective PRP 0.16*** -0.00 0.06** 0.30***    
Engagement: Changes 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.06** -0.00 0.02   
Engagement:Targets 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07***  
Listed 0.09*** -0.12*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.01 -0.00 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Table 4b: Correlations between HRM variables and listing for REPONSE 
  
 Training Autonomy Team 
Working 
Individual 
PRP 
Collective 
PRP 
Engagement: 
Changes 
Engagement: 
Targets 
Training        
Autonomy 0.09***       
Team Working 0.14*** 0.00      
Individual PRP 0.13*** 0.06*** 0.03     
Collective PRP 0.16*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.21***    
Engagement: Changes 0.08*** -0.01 0.06*** 0.00 0.00   
Engagement:Targets -0.01 -0.01 0.07*** -0.03* -0.03* 0.08***  
Listed 0.18*** 0.05*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.21*** -0.01 -0.06*** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
4.3 Control variables 
Because managerial coordination and control mechanisms are likely to vary 
with workforce numbers, irrespective of the form of governance, we control for 
establishment and organization size. Size has been shown to be related to the 
degree of formalization of the HRM system and hence the likelihood of having 
formal practices in place (Konzelmann et al. 2006). We also control for 
structural conditions, including workplace age, sector of activity, market share, 
the dynamics of the market (growing, stable or declining), and the composition 
of the workforce in the establishment (by reference to the proportion of white 
collar workers).  Table 5 indicates the distribution of control variables for both 
samples. 
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Table 5: Control variables for REPONSE 2004 and WERS 2004 
 
 REPONSE 
2004 (%s) 
 WERS 
2004 (%s) 
Organization size    
Less than 1000 workers 66.2  49.5 
1000 or more 33.8  50.5 
Establishment size    
Less than 50 workers 22.7  43.8 
50 to 199 35.2  26.6 
200 to 499 15.9  14.3 
500 or more 26.2  15.2 
Sector    
Education, health, social   8.2 Manufacturing 19.1 
Agri-food   4.1 Electricity, gas and water   2.7 
Automotive   9.2 Construction   6.5 
Consumer goods   5.5 Wholesale and retail 19.6 
Construction   6.5 Hotels and restaurants   5.7 
Intermediate goods, energy 16.2 Transport and communication   6.8 
Commerce 17.2 Financial services   8.3 
Business services 17.3 Other business services 14.3 
Financial services, real estate   5.9 Public administration   0.3 
Private services   4.2 Education   3.4 
Transport   5.7 Health   7.4 
  Other community services   6.1 
Establishment age    
Less than 20 years 31.4  46.2 
More than 20 years 68.6  53.8 
Market share    
less than 3% 12.2 Less than 5% 28.5 
3 to 24% 30.2 5-24% 25.5 
25% or more 30.6 25% or more 23.2 
not concerned, do not know 27.0 not concerned, do not know 22.7 
State of the market    
Growth  54.5  48.9 
Decline 16.3      8.7 
Other 29.2  39.1 
Share of white-collar workers at 
the establishment    
Less than 15% 23.4  43.6 
15 to 30% 24.1  22.6 
31 to 50% 20.4  13.2 
More than 50% 32.1  20.1 
Total sample size 2904   1563 
 
Note: the percentages are unweighted. 
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4.4. Empirical analysis of the effects of stock exchange listing on HRM 
practices 
Logistic regressions were used to estimate the (logarithm of the) odds-ratio of 
an establishment being one of the most intensive users of each of the HRM 
practices.
4
 This approach yields a series of 7 estimations for each country, in the 
following form:  
ln (Pij / 1 – Pij) = a + b CGj +∑
=
K
k
kjk Xc
1
+ εj  
where Pij is the probability of the intensive use of practice i = {1,…, 7} for 
establishment j; CGj is the corporate governance variable (with ‘non listed’ as 
the reference category); X jk is the set of K controls; a, b and (c1 ;… ; cK) are the 
estimated coefficients; and ε j is the independent and identically distributed 
random noise. In each case we have indicated the percentage of the sample that 
the regressions explain.  
 
HRM  practices were described as follows:  
P1j : the probability of establishment j being among the establishments 
providing greatest training effort 
P2j : the probability of establishment j being among the establishments 
providing greatest autonomy to their workers 
P3j : the probability of establishment j being among the establishments 
making most use of team-working devices  
P4j : the probability of establishment j being among the establishments 
making most use of individual performance-related pay  
P5j : the probability of establishment j being among the establishments 
making most use of collective performance-related pay  
P6j : the probability of establishment j being among the establishments 
where worker engagement on workplace changes was most commonly 
observed  
P7j : the probability of establishment j being among the establishments 
where worker engagement on target setting was most commonly observed 
The results for WERS are summarized in Table 6a-c and the results for 
REPONSE are summarized in Table 7a-c.  
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Table 6a: HRM practices regressions for WERS 2004 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 Training Autonomy Team working 
 
% of dependent variable 
coded 1  
41% 29% 
36% 
 coefficient (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
coefficient (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
coefficient (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
Intercept  -1.10*** (.23)     -1.43*** (.26)     -.88*** (.23)  
Corporate governance          
Listed      .03 (.14)    1.03      -.06 (.17)   .94   .30** (.14) 1.36 
Non listed      Ref   Ref   Ref   
Organization size          
Less than 1000 workers      Ref   Ref   Ref   
1000 or more    .63*** (.14)    1.87      -.13 (.15)   .88     -.04 (.14)  .96 
Establishment size          
Less than 50 workers    -.36*** (.14)     .70      .50*** (.15)  1.65     -.04 (.14)  .96 
50 to 199      Ref   Ref   Ref   
200 to 499    -.26 (.18)  .77      -.44** (.23)   .64     -.08 (.18)   .92 
500 or more    -.13 (.18)  .88      -.25 (.21)   .78     -.25 (.18)  .78 
Sector          
Wholesale and retail      Ref   Ref   Ref   
Manufacturing     .03 (.20)    1.03      -.11 (.21)   .90      .22 (.19) 1.25 
Utilities   1.36*** (.37)    3.91      -.85* (.51)   .43    .54*** (.36) 4.66 
Construction     .24 (.26)    1.27       .24 (.26)    1.27     -.38 (.28)  .68 
Hotels and restaurants     -.09 (.28)      .91      -.89*** (.34)   .41      .13 (.26) 1.14 
  Transport & 
communication 
    .32 (.25) 1.38      -.04 (.28)   .96      .25 (.25) 1.29 
Financial services   1.17*** (.24) 3.21      -.24 (.27)      .78    .94*** (.23) 2.55 
Other business services  .42** (.20) 1.52      -.31 (.22)      .73      .27 (.20) 1.31 
Community services   1.02*** (.19) 2.77       .27 (.20    1.31    .59*** (.19) 1.81 
Establishment age          
Less than 20 years     Ref   Ref   Ref   
20 years or more    -.02 (.12)     .98      -.05 (.13)      .95    -.16 (.11)  .85 
Market share          
Less than 5%    -.23 (.17)     .80       .07 (.18) 1.07    -.33** (.16)  .72 
5 to 24%     Ref   Ref   Ref   
25% or more     .14 (.16)   1.16       .04 (.18) 1.04    -.17 (.16)  .85 
Don’t know    -.25 (.16)     .78       .09 (.18) 1.09    -.10 (.16)  .91 
State of the market          
Growth .28** (.12)   1.32       .08 (.13) 1.08   .34*** (.12) 1.40 
Decline    -.21 (.23)     .81      -.06 (.23)  .94     .13 (.21) 1.13 
Other     Ref   Ref   Ref   
Proportion of white collar 
workers 
         
Less than 15%     Ref   Ref   Ref   
15 to 30%   -.08 (.15)     .92      .10 (.16) 1.11     .08 (.14) 1.08 
31% to 50%    .41** (.18)   1.51      .59*** (.19) 1.80     .14 (.18) 1.15 
More than 50%  62*** (.16)   1.86   1.61*** (.17) 4.98     .12 (.16) 1.13 
Number of observations                   1563                   1563                   1563 
Nagelkerke R-square                   .16     .17   .07 
% pairs concordant 66.8% 73.2% 65.5% 
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Table 6b: HRM practices regressions for WERS 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Individual PRP Collective PRP 
% of dependent variable 
coded 1 
44% 
33% 
 coefficient (std error) odds-ratio coefficient (std error) odds-ratio 
Intercept     -.57*** (.23)    -.69*** (.23)  
Corporate governance       
Listed .25* (.14) 1.28    .37*** (.14) 1.45 
Non listed ref   ref   
Organization size       
Less than 1000 workers ref   ref   
1000 or more .22* (.14) 1.25      .11 (.14) 1.11 
Establishment size       
Less than 50 workers -.31** (.14)  .73     -.25* (.15)   .78 
50 to 199 ref   ref   
200 to 499  .37** (.18) 1.45     -.11 (.19)   .89 
500 or more    .71*** (.18) 2.04 .33* (.18) 1.39 
Sector       
Wholesale and retail ref   ref   
Manufacturing    -.22 (.18)  .80      .08 (.19) 1.08 
Utilities    -.15 (.35)  .86    -.48 (.36)   .62 
Construction    -.51** (.26)  .60    -.53** (.27)   .59 
Hotels and restaurants     -.47* (.27)  .63    -.11 (.27)   .90 
  Transport & 
communication 
   -.31 (.24)  .73    -.46* (.26)   .63 
Financial services   .88*** (.25) 2.40 .50** (.23) 1.64 
Other business services     .29 (.20) 1.33      .06 (.20) 1.06 
Community services  -1.03*** (.20)  .36  -1.37*** (.23)   .25 
Establishment age       
Less than 20 years ref   ref   
20 years or more     .05 (.12) 1.05    -.07 (.12)   .93 
Market share       
Less than 5%     .10 (.16) 1.11    -.26 (.17)   .77 
5 to 24% ref   ref   
25% or more     .12 (.16) 1.13    -.08 (.16)   .93 
Don’t know -.40*** (.16)   .67    -.27 (.16)   .77 
State of the market       
Growth    -.02 (.12)  .98     .08 (.12) 1.09 
Decline    -.14 (.21)  .87    -.22 (.23)   .80 
Other ref   ref   
Proportion of white collar 
workers 
      
Less than 15% ref   ref   
15 to 30%  .35** (.15) 1.42 .34** (.15) 1.41 
31% to 50% .   61*** (.18) 1.85 .41** (.18) 1.51 
More than 50%   .80*** (.16) 2.22   .42*** (.17) 1.52 
Number of observations 1563 1563 
Nagelkerke R-square     .17     .13 
% pairs concordant  65.9%   68.8% 
 26 
Table 6c: HRM practices regressions for WERS 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Engagement:  changes Engagement:  targets 
% of dependent variable 
coded 1 
23% 
32% 
 coefficient (std error) odds-ratio coefficient (std error) odds-ratio 
Intercept    -1.50*** (.26)       -.76*** (.25)  
Corporate governance       
Listed      -.10 (.16)  .90 .20 (.16) 1.22 
Non listed ref   ref   
Organization size       
Less than 1000 workers ref   ref   
1000 or more    .31** (.15)     1.36     -.51*** (.15)   .60 
Establishment size       
Less than 50 workers      -.16 (.16)  .85 .16 (.15) 1.18 
50 to 199 ref   ref   
200 to 499       .09 (.20)     1.09  -.34* (.20)   .71 
500 or more       .17 (.20)     1.19      -.10 (.20)   .91 
Sector       
Wholesale and retail ref   Ref   
Manufacturing      .14 (.21)     1.15  .07 (.21) 1.08 
Utilities     .97*** (.36)     2.63 .23 (.39) 1.26 
Construction     -.53 (.35) .59      -.39 (.29)   .68 
Hotels and restaurants      -.01 (.31) .99      -.52 (.33)   .60 
  Transport & 
communication 
    -.11 (.29) .89      -.32 (.30)   .73 
Financial services      .27 (.26)     1.31       .26 (.25) 1.30 
Other business services     -.15 (.24) .86       .39* (.22) 1.48 
Community services    .79*** (.21)     2.21       .30 (.20) 1.35 
Establishment age       
Less than 20 years ref   ref   
20 years or more      .07 (.13)    1.08     -.14 (.13)   .87 
Market share       
Less than 5%    -.08 (.18)      .92       .03 (.18) 1.03 
5 to 24% ref   ref   
25% or more    -.04 (.17)      .96     -.01 (.17)   .99 
Don’t know    -.22 (.18)      .80     -.10 (.17   .90 
State of the market       
Growth     .22* (.13)    1.25     -.01 (.13)   .99 
Decline     .14 (.24)    1.15   -.70*** (.26)   .49 
Other ref   ref   
Proportion of white collar 
workers 
      
Less than 15% ref   ref   
15 to 30%    -.09 (.16)      .92 .42*** (.16) 1.52 
31% to 50%    -.44** (.21)      .64     .41** (.19) 1.51 
More than 50%      .08 (.18)    1.09 .47*** (.17) 1.60 
Number of observations 1563 1381 
Nagelkerke R-square     .06    .09 
% pairs concordant   76.6% 69.4% 
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Table 7a: HRM practices regressions for REPONSE 2004 
 
 
 
Training Autonomy Team working 
% of dependent variable 
coded 1 
35.6% 
27.1% 
19.3% 
  coefficient  (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
coefficient  
 
(std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
coefficient  (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
Intercept  -2.40 *** ( .19)  -1.18 *** (.19)   -3.84 *** (.28)   
Corporate governance              
  Listed     .18 * (.90) 1.20   .17 * (.10)  1.18    .46 *** (.11)  1.59 
  Unlisted    ref    ref   ref    
Organization size              
Less than 1000 workers    ref    ref   ref    
1000 or more    .46 *** (.10) 1.59  -.06 (.11)    .94   -.01 (.12)    .99 
Establishment size              
Less than 50 workers   -.36 *** (.13)   .70  -.32** (.13)    .73   .11 (.15)  1.12 
50 to 199    ref    ref   ref    
200 to 499    .28 ** (.13) 1.32   -.27 * (.14)    .76   .22 (.15)  1.24 
500 or more    .68 *** (.12) 1.98 0.14 (.13)  1.15   .50 *** (.14)  1.65 
Sector              
education, health, social  -.44 ** (.22)   .65 0.24 (.19)  1.27 1.21 *** (.27)  3.34 
agri-food    .61 *** (.24) 1.85  -.60 ** (.29)    .55   .81 ** (.34)  2.25 
automotive   .56 *** (.18) 1.75  -.25 (.19)    .78 1.90 *** (.24)  6.72 
consumer goods   .62 *** (.21) 1.86  -.74 *** (.24)    .48 1.55 *** (.27)  4.70 
construction   .64 *** (.21) 1.89  -.40 * (.22)    .67 1.41 *** (.27)  4.09 
intermediate goods, 
energy 
  .77 *** (.16) 2.16  -.26 (.16)    .77 1.54 *** (.22)  4.69 
commerce    ref    ref   ref    
business services   .26 * (.16) 1.30  -.08 (.15)    .92 1.26 *** (.23)  3.52 
financial services, real 
estate 
  .68 *** (.21) 1.98  -.05  (.21)    .95   .61 ** (.30)  1.84 
private services -.17 (.27)   .84 -.72 ** (.328)    .48   .52 (.36)  1.68 
transports  .70 *** (.22)  2.01 -.71 *** (.26)    .49   .66 ** (.33)  1.93 
Establishment age              
Less than 20 years    ref    ref   ref    
more than 20years   .06 (.10)  1.06  -.23 ** (.10)    .79   .03 (.12) 1.03 
Market share              
less than 3%  -.08 (.15)   .92   .01 (.15)  1.01   .08 (.17) 1.08 
3 to 24%   ref    ref   ref    
25% or more   .10 (.11)  1.11  -.27 ** (.11)    .76   .10 (.13) 1.10 
not concerned, do not know  -.14 (.12)    .87  -.34 *** (.12)    .71  -.04 (.14)   .96 
State of the market              
growth    .23 ** (.10)  1.26  -.02 (.10)     .98   .20 * (.12) 1.22 
decline  -.17 (.14)    .84  -.24 * (.14)    .79   .20 (.15) 1.22 
other   ref    ref   ref    
Proportion of white 
collar workers 
   
Less than 15%   ref    ref   ref   
15 to 30%   .47 *** (.14)   1.61  .23 (.16)  1.26  .74 *** (.18) 2.09  
31% to 50% 1.04 *** (.15)  2.84     .64*** (.16)  1.89  .81 *** (.18) 2.25 
More than 50% 1.58 *** (.14)  4.88   1.58*** (.14)  4.86  .76 *** (.17) 2.14 
Number of observations                 2904               2904                2904 
Nagelkerke R-square .25   .16    .15 
% pairs concordant                    75.3                    71.3                    71.7 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7b: HRM practices regressions for REPONSE 2004 
 
 
 
Individual PRP Collective PRP 
% of dependent variable coded 1 37.7% 41.3% 
  coefficient  (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
coefficient  (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
Intercept   -.99 *** (.17)  -.78 *** (.17)  
Corporate governance          
  Listed    .28 *** (.09) 1.32   .42 *** (.09) 1.52 
  Unlisted ref   ref    
Organization size          
Less than 1000 workers ref   ref    
1000 or more   -.15 (.10)   .86   .17 * (.10) 1.19 
Establishment size          
Less than 50 workers   -.36 *** (.12)   .70  -.69 *** (.12)   .50 
50 to 199 ref   ref    
200 to 499   -.09 (.13)    .91   .28 ** (.12) 1.32 
500 or more    .15 (.12) 1.16   .45 *** (.12) 1.57 
Sector          
education, health, social -3.10 *** (.34)   .04 -2.43 *** (.26)   .09 
agri-food   -.43 * (.23)   .65   .17 (.22) 1.19 
automotive -1.03 *** (.18)   .36  -.59 *** (.17)   .56 
consumer goods   -.49 ** (.20)   .61  -.62 *** (.20)   .54 
construction    .28 (.18) 1.32  -.64 *** (.19)   .53 
intermediate goods, energy   -.52 *** (.14)   .60  -.49 *** (.14)   .61 
commerce ref   ref    
business services   -.26 * (.14)   .77  -.74 *** (.14)   .48 
financial services, real estate    .33 (.20) 1.39  -.61 *** (.20)   .54 
private services   -.87 *** (.24)   .42  -1.37 *** (.25)   .25 
transports   -.32 (.20)   .73  -.89 *** (.20)   .41 
Establishment age          
Less than 20 years ref   ref    
more than 20years   -.20 ** (.09)   .81   .10 (.09) 1.10 
Market share          
less than 3%    .02 (.14) 1.02  -.05 (.14)   .95 
3 to 24% ref   ref    
25% or more  -.10 (.10)   .90   .13 (.10) 1.14 
not concerned, do not know   .03 (.11) 1.03  -.20 * (.11)   .82 
State of the market          
growth    .34 *** (.10) 1.40   .50 *** (.10) 1.64 
decline   .05 (.13) 1.06  -.19 (.13)   .83 
other ref    ref     
Proportion of white collar workers       
Less than 15% ref   ref   
15 to 30%   .75 *** (.13) 2.11  .45 ***     (.13)   1.56 
31% to 50% 1.12 *** (.14) 3.06   .64 ***     (.13)   1.89 
More than 50% 1.37 *** (.13) 3.94   .77 ***     (.12)   2.15 
Number of observations              2904                   2904 
Nagelkerke R-square   .20      .21 
% pairs concordant                  71.8 72.7 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7c: HRM practices regressions for REPONSE 2004 
 
 
 
Engagement:  changes Engagement:  targets 
% of dependent variable 
coded 1 
28.6% 
12.8% 
  coefficient  (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
coefficient  (std 
error) 
odds-
ratio 
Intercept  -.95 *** (.20)  -2.38 *** (.26)  
Corporate governance          
  Listed  -.11 (.11)   .89   -.26 * (.14)    .77 
  Unlisted ref   ref    
Organization size          
Less than 1000 workers ref   ref    
1000 or more   .01 (.11) 1.01   -.18 (.14)   .83 
Establishment size          
Less than 50 workers   .04 (.14) 1.04    .13 (.17) 1.14 
50 to 199 ref   ref    
200 to 499   .20 (.14) 1.22   -.12 (.19)   .88 
500 or more   .41 *** (.13) 1.50    .50 *** (.16) 1.66 
Sector          
education, health, social   .53 ** (.21) 1.70  1.35 *** (.24) 3.85 
agri-food  -.04 (.27)   .96  -.18 (.41)   .83 
automotive   .03 (.19) 1.03   .49* (.26) 1.64 
consumer goods   .06 (.23) 1.07   .29 (.32) 1.34 
construction  -.03 (.24)   .97   .52 (.30) 1.69 
intermediate goods, 
energy   .02 (.17) 1.02   .49 ** (.23) 1.64 
commerce ref   ref    
business services  -.18 (.17)   .83   .34 (.24) 1.41 
financial services, real 
estate   .02 (.24) 1.02   .26 (.32) 1.30 
private services  -.02 (.27)   .98   .64 * (.33) 1.89 
transports   .43 * (.22) 1.53   .45 (.30) 1.57 
Establishment age          
Less than 20 years ref   ref    
more than 20years   .10 (.11) 1.10  .12 (.14) 1.13 
Market share          
less than 3%   -.34 ** (.16)   .71 -.00 (.21) 1.00 
3 to 24% ref   ref    
25% or more   -.19 (.12)   .83 -.10 (.16)   .91 
not concerned, do not 
know   -.39 *** (.13)   .68  .08 (.16) 1.08 
State of the market          
growth    -.18* (.11)   .83 -.02 (.13)   .98 
decline   -.13 (.14)   .88 -.15 (.19)   .86 
other ref    ref     
Proportion of white 
collar workers       
Less than 15% ref   ref   
15 to 30%    .04 (.15) 1.04 -.17 (.19)   .84 
31% to 50%   .19 (.15) 1.21  .17 (.18) 1.19 
More than 50%   .19 (.14) 1.21 -.15 (.18)   .86 
Number of observations               2287                2679 
Nagelkerke R-square     .03       .05 
% pairs concordant                  58.9 63.3 
 
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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In Britain, as in the descriptive analysis, listing is positively and significantly 
associated with team working and PRP (individual and collective).
5
 Considering 
odd-ratios gives us information on the size of the effects. Listed companies are 
1.36 times more likely to have high levels of team working, 1.45 times more 
likely to have an intensive use of collective forms of PRP, and 1.28 times more 
likely to have an intensive use of individual PRP.  The positive correlation 
between listing and training does not persist (in the sense of no longer being 
significant) after the introduction of controls; nor does the negative correlation 
between listing and autonomy. In other words, it is the various control factors 
that explain the positive correlation between listing and training and the 
negative correlation between listing and autonomy in our descriptive analysis. 
 
In France we have evidence of a significant positive relationship between listing 
and team working and PRP (individual and collective), as in Britain. In 
addition, in France listing is significantly and positively related with training 
and autonomy and there is a negative link to engagement over targets. The link 
with listing is particularly strong for two practices: collective PRP and team 
working. Establishments belonging to listed companies are 1.53 times more 
likely strongly to implement collective forms of PRP and 1.59 times more likely 
to widely develop team working.  
 
Econometric estimations for engagement variables yield similar results to the 
descriptive analysis in that listing is not significantly associated to engagement 
on change in either country.  Engagement on targets is negatively associated 
with listing in France, but independent of it in Britain. 
 
Altogether, these results indicate that establishments of listed companies are 
relatively more involved in the use of high commitment HRM practices than 
others,
6
 and this is especially the case in France.  
 
The analysis also highlights the role of establishment size, sectoral effects and 
workforce composition in the two countries. Establishment size is correlated 
with more intense use of HRM, but the results are not uniform across countries.  
In France, the use of each of the main HRM variables increases in the largest 
establishments (those over 500 employees) while for two of the variables, those 
relating to training and individual PRP, there is a negative correlation for the 
smallest ones (those employing less than 50). In Britain, the picture is not as 
clear: the smallest establishments are less likely to train but more likely to offer 
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autonomy to their workers, while establishment size is positively correlated 
with individual and collective PRP.   
 
Employment in financial services is positively associated in both countries with 
training, team-working and collective PRP, but not with engagement, autonomy 
or individual PRP. In Britain, the utilities sector is positively associated with 
training, team working and engagement. This is compatible with case-study 
evidence to the effect that the firms in the utilities sector are more likely than 
those in manufacturing to have enduring labour-management partnerships 
notwithstanding the influence of shareholder pressures, thanks in part to the role 
played by sector-specific regulation for the protection of consumer interests in 
lengthening time horizons (Deakin et al., 2002, 2006).  Manufacturing 
constitutes a point of cross-national difference: it is significantly and positively 
associated with training and team working and negatively associated with both 
forms of PRP in France, but there is no such effect in Britain. 
 
The proportion of white collar workers is highly correlated with an intensive use 
of high commitment HRM practices (except for worker engagement practices).  
The higher the share of white collar workers, the greater the use of autonomy, 
training, team working and PRP (both collective and individual), suggesting that 
these kinds of high commitment HRM practices are primarily directed at more 
highly qualified workers. 
 
4.5 Assessment 
How should our findings be assessed?  We are able, first of all, to say 
something about the importance of a stock market listing for HRM.  We find 
very little support for the existence of a corporate governance constraint.  From 
the French survey we can see that listed companies are significantly more likely 
than other firms to provide training, casting doubt on the claim that the listed 
company form leads to a reduced investment in human capital.  Most strikingly, 
we found evidence that managers in French and British listed companies are 
more likely to try to foster team working than their counterparts in non-listed 
firms, the opposite results to those predicted by the idea of a governance 
constraint.  The results on PRP confirms what we would expect, namely that 
listed companies make greater use of financial and other performance-based 
incentives than other firms.  Overall, then, our empirical evidence provides no 
support for the ‘constraint hypothesis’. 
 
What then of the ‘partnership hypothesis’?    This holds that shareholder 
pressure might actively assist the emergence of a high-commitment approach to 
HRM, precisely because of the focus on maintaining financial returns which it 
provides for management.  Implementing high commitment HRM may be also a 
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way to enhance worker motivation in a context where workers may feel 
disengaged given the priority given to the interests of external shareholders.  
We find some evidence for this in the form of the positive correlations between 
listing and team working in both countries and between autonomy and training 
in France.  However, the absence of a positive link between listing and 
engagement (and the negative association with engagement over targets in 
France) suggests that there are limits to any ‘partnership’ approach.  Managers 
may take steps to motivate employees, but they are less willing to give them a 
voice in the way work is organized.    
 
What can we say about the possible role of cross-national differences in terms 
of the strength of capital market pressures and of the regulatory framework? 
Our empirical evidence tends to show there exist important similarities in the 
HRM profiles of listed firms in Britain and France.  The association we observe 
between listing and high-performance HRM practices is perhaps slightly more 
intense in the French context, in particular given the positive correlation there 
between listing on the one hand and worker autonomy and training on the other.  
The greater tendency of French companies to adopt formal HRM practices is a 
theme of other recent studies analysing REPONSE and WERS (Marsden, 
Belfield and Benhamoun, 2007).  In assessing how far such a difference might 
be linked to variations at the level of the regulatory framework, we have to be 
cautious. The effects of specific regulatory influences cannot be directly 
observed in the WERS and REPONSE datasets.  Our overview of the regulatory 
framework in the two countries suggested that a significant role could be played 
by labour regulation as a countervailing force to shareholder pressure in France.  
Labour regulation formally restrains management in various respects, but the 
restraint can be viewed as ‘beneficial’ in so far as it rules out managerial 
strategies based on a cost-cutting approach, and favours those involving 
partnership (Streeck 2004).  It is possible to be specific about the possible role 
played by one particular aspect of French labour law, namely the rules 
governing employee representation in the workplace.  The 50-employee 
threshold is significant for determining the presence of an enterprise committee 
at firm level and, in firms with multiple establishments, at establishment level 
too; as additional thresholds are reached, the required size of the committee 
increases, along with other, complementary rights of representation (see 
Pélissier, Supiot and Jeammaud 2006: 710).  Although the fit is not precise, the 
association between establishment size and the increasing formalisation of 
HRM in France, and the absence of a similar finding for Britain (where no 
equivalent issue of firm or establishment level thresholds arose at the time when 
the WERS 2004 survey was being carried out), is suggestive of a possible role 
for the law of the kind we have identified. 
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In Britain, as we have seen, case study evidence suggests that listed companies 
adopt a range of approaches to the management of labour, depending on their 
sectoral context.  There is some evidence to support the argument that sectoral 
effects could play a role in fostering labour-management partnership in the 
British case in the form of the results obtained for the utilities sector, where 
firms are more likely than elsewhere to include training, team working and 
engagement on changes among their HRM practices. 
 
Overall, it is the similarities between the two countries which are most striking, 
not their differences.  In particular, the effect of listing on teamworking and on 
performance related pay was strongly evident in WERS and REPONSE.  
 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper we have reviewed evidence on the relationship between corporate 
governance and human resource management in Britain and France.  The two 
systems of corporate governance are, to a degree, converging, at least at the 
level of formal law and regulations.  France has adopted a more shareholder-
friendly legal regime over the past decade.  The pattern of share ownership in 
France is also changing, with a greater role for overseas investors and a higher 
level of stock market activity, although cross-shareholdings are still much more 
widespread than is the case in the UK.  In Britain, dispersed share ownership 
remains the norm, together with a high level of liquidity in the stock market; 
UK-based institutional investors remain a powerful influence, but as in France, 
overseas ownership is growing.  A divergent feature is the strength of labour 
law in the two countries.  In the UK, labour laws remain weak, despite some 
adjustment to the mainland European model of employee information and 
consultation rights.  In France, labour regulation is strong by international 
standards. 
 
How does this (shifting) pattern of corporate ownership, governance and 
regulation affect labour relations and human resource management? In both 
countries, a stock market listing is associated with an intensive use of high 
commitment HRM practices in relation to teamworking and the use of PRP.  In 
France, but not in Britain, there is a link between listing and the adoption of 
HRM practices relating to worker autonomy and training, but in neither country 
is listing associated with worker engagement on workplace changes or target 
setting.   
 
On this basis, we have no evidence to support the claim that a stock market 
listing operates as a constraint on the capacity of managers to implement high 
performance HRM practices.  On the contrary, shareholder pressure could act as 
a stimulant to the adoption of practices aimed at enhancing worker motivation – 
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and apparently to a greater extent in France than in Britain.  Can we go further 
and say that a stock market listing is an active inducement to management to 
enter into partnership-style relations with employees?  We find only limited 
evidence to support such a claim, given the lack of an association between 
listing and engagement over workforce changes and performance targets.  In 
addition, it is unclear whether the adoption of these HRM practices really 
reflects a high-commitment approach by listed establishments or a form of 
control, where under-performing employees in such intensive performance 
management systems face job insecurity. In this regard, future research should 
explore the extent to which listing affects the relationships between PRP 
systems and employee outcomes such as employee turnover, felt job insecurity 
and organizational commitment. 
 
In ending, it is important to bear in mind what our analysis has not been able to 
establish.  We have evidence that corporate governance form, and in particular 
being listed, affects HRM, but we do not know the strength of this effect in 
particular types of case within the listed company category.  A more precise 
analysis of ownership structure among listed companies could help to reveal 
whether the degree of dispersion of ownership, for example, or the presence of 
particular types of investors, such as pension funds or hedge funds, influences 
the management of labour.  That kind of analysis is not possible using WERS as 
it stands, but it may become possible if WERS is linked in future to company-
level data on share ownership.  Some data of this kind exist already for 
REPONSE, which makes the linking of WERS to other datasets an interesting 
prospect.   
 
A second limitation is that we do not offer a longitudinal analysis, using panel 
data, of the kind which might be able to tell us whether the regulatory 
convergence which we have observed in having an impact at workplace level.  
It may be possible to deploy the panel datasets in WERS and REPONSE to this 
end, but it should be noted that the WERS panel dataset is more confined in the 
scope of its questions than the principal dataset.  How to conduct a longitudinal 
study, and how to link the two panel datasets to other data sources which might 
give a more fully rounded picture of the interaction between corporate 
governance and employment outcomes, is a matter for future research. 
 
Nor finally, do we have any evidence on the extent to which employment 
relations impact on financial and economic performance.  Again, this would 
only be possible if both WERS and REPONSE were linked to company-level 
data on these questions.  Our analysis has, however, pointed to the potential 
value of such a step in maximising the potential of WERS and REPONSE.  
More generally, we have highlighted some of the ways in which corporate 
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governance and employment relations interact in different national contexts, 
thereby opening up new avenues for research in this area of growing 
importance. 
 
 
\ 
 
Notes 
1
 We decided not to impose, at a further level, fully consistent establishment 
size thresholds for both WERS and REPONSE, as this appeared to us less 
crucial than taking into account legal forms for the analysis of corporate 
governance variables. Furthermore, restricting the WERS sample to 
establishments of 20 workers or more would lead us to drop out nearly one third 
of the sample (from 1563 to 1160) and therefore would greatly reduce the 
statistical power of our sample. This was confirmed when we estimated our 
regressions on this reduced sample (details are omitted for reasons of space). 
2
 The closest to this in WERS is a question which asks whether an individual or 
family owns 50% or more of the company (ACONINT). 
3
 In addition, our estimations show that not only does the effect of being listed 
differ from one country to another, but that the effects of the control variables 
differ.  This means that if we were to pool the datasets we would have to 
introduce an interaction analysis for each variable, doubling the number of 
explanatory variables and running the risk of making the analysis 
uninterpretable.  
4
 We decided not to weight the data, following the advice of Reiter, Zanutto and 
Hunter (2005). They review the advantages and disadvantages of using 
weighted versus unweighted data for complex surveys. They conclude that 
weighting data might be an appropriate strategy for descriptive statistics, but is 
a source of controversy for multivariate analyses. The key advantage when 
conducting multivariate analyses of using unweighted data instead of weighted 
data is that it produces smaller standard errors (and therefore increases 
statistical power). Indeed, when we ran our analyses using weighted data we 
found that all our standard errors increased (details are omitted for reasons of 
space).  Reiter et al. (2005) also state that a simple way to take weights into 
account is to include independent variables that correspond to features of the 
weighting design, an approach which we followed in our analyses. Furthermore, 
they also note that when analyses involve missing cases (such as here) the 
weights no longer reflect the representativeness of the sample. 
5
 If we confine our analysis to samples of 20 or more employees the WERS 
sample reduces from 1563 to 1160 and listing remains significantly associated 
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with team working and collective PRP, but is no longer significantly related to 
individual PRP (details are available from the authors on request). 
6
 We ran these estimations with different thresholds (higher and lower) where 
the scale permitted, to check the robustness of our findings (details are omitted 
for reasons of space). The only relationships that were sensitive to these 
changes were for autonomy and training in France and autonomy in Britain. 
Regarding the relationship to training in the French dataset we were able to 
specify that being listed is related to intensive training but not to very intensive 
training profiles (the relationship is still positive and even more significant for 
higher thresholds but is no more significant for thresholds lower than 20%). The 
relationship between autonomy and listing in WERS becomes significant (and 
negative) when using a very low threshold of 16%, but not at any other 
available thresholds. Conversely in REPONSE, the relationship between listing 
and autonomy is no longer significant for a very low threshold   (around 16%). 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A: construction of composite variables for HRM in WERS 2004 
 
Variable 
 
Survey questions 
 
Frequency 
(unweighted) 
% of 
establishments 
 
Training 
Dummy variable where 1 = 40% or more employees given off-the-job 
training AND two days or more training received in last year, 0 
otherwise 
 
0: 59 
1: 41 
 
Autonomy 
Dummy variable where 1 = a score of greater than 3 from the 
arithmetic mean of the below 3 items, 0 otherwise: 
1. Degree of discretion in work: 4 (a lot) to 1 (none) 
2. Degree of control over pace of work : 4 (a lot) to 1 (none) 
3. Degree of involvement in decisions over how work is 
organized: 4 (a lot) to 1 (none) 
 
0: 71 
1: 29 
 
Team working 
Dummy variable where 1 = 100% of the largest occupational group at 
this workplace work in formally designated teams, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
0: 64 
1: 36 
Individual 
performance related 
pay (PRP) 
Dummy variable where 1 = a score of 2 from the count across the 
below 2 items, 0 otherwise:  
1. Individual performance used to determine payment by results: 
Yes (1) or No (0) 
2. Payment due to merit pay: Yes (1) or No (0) 
 
0: 56 
1: 44 
Collective 
performance related 
pay (PRP) 
Dummy variable where 1 = a score of 3 or more from the sum of the 
below 4 items, 0 otherwise: 
1. Collective performance used to determine payment by results: 
Yes (1) or No (0) 
2. Employees receive profit-related payments or profit-related 
bonuses: Yes (1) or No (0) 
3. Pay settlement influenced by organization’s financial 
performance: Yes (1) or No (0) 
4. Pay settlement influenced by organization’s productivity 
levels: Yes (1) or No (0) 
 
0: 67 
1: 33 
 
Engagement re: 
workplace change 
Dummy variable where 1 = a score greater than 4 from the arithmetic 
mean of the below 2 items, 0 otherwise: 
1. Decisions at this workplace are made without consulting 
employees : 5 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree) 
2. We do not introduce changes without first discussing 
implications with employees: 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly 
disagree) 
 
0: 77 
1: 23 
 
Engagement re: 
targets 
(Only for establishments where targets are set, reducing the sample 
from 1563 to 1381) 
Are targets (sales, costs, profits, productivity, quality. turnover, 
satisfaction, etc.) set in consultation with employees or employee 
representatives? 
Dummy variable where 1 = yes, 0 otherwise 
 
0: 68 
1: 32 
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Table B: construction of composite variables for HRM in REPONSE 2004 
 
Variable Survey questions Frequency 
(unweighted) % 
of 
establishments 
 
Training 
Dummy variable where 1= 3% or more of the total wage bill is spent 
on training, 0 otherwise 
 
0: 64 
1: 36 
 
Autonomy 
Dummy variable where 1 = a score of 2 or more from the count across 
the 3 items below, 0 otherwise: 
1. Work is defined as precise tasks (0) or in terms of global 
objectives (1). 
2. In case of a minor incident, workers are encouraged to refer to 
a manager or supervisor (0) or to solve the problem themselves (1)  
3. Control over work is continuous (0), intermittent (0) or 
occasional (1)  
 
 
0: 73 
1: 27 
 
Team working 
Dummy variable where 1= a score of 5 or more from the count across 
the below 2 items, 0 otherwise: 
1. Share of employees involved in autonomous work teams: 
none (0), less than 5% (1), from 5 to 19% (2), from 20 to 49% (3) 
or more than 50% (4).  
2. Share of employees involved in pluridisciplinary work groups 
or project teams: none (0), less than 5% (1), from 5 to 19% (2), 
from 20 to 49% (3) or more than 50% (4) 
 
0: 81 
1: 19 
 
 
Individual 
performance 
related pay (PRP) 
Dummy variable where 1= a score of 4 from the count across the 
below 4 items, 0 otherwise: 
Did non-managerial workers benefit in 2004 from: 
1. Individualised pay increases? Yes (1) or No (0) 
2. Individual performance-related bonuses? Yes (1) or No (0) 
Did managerial workers benefit in 2004 from: 
3. Individualised pay increases? Yes (1) or No (0) 
4. Individual performance-related bonuses? Yes (1) or No (0) 
 
 
0: 62 
1: 38 
 
 
Collective 
performance 
related pay (PRP) 
Dummy variable where 1= a score of 3 from the count across the 
below 3 items, 0 otherwise: 
1. Did non-managerial workers benefit in 2004 from collective 
performance-related bonuses? Yes (1) or No (0) 
2. Did managerial workers benefit in 2004 from collective 
performance-related bonuses? Yes (1) or No (0) 
3. Over the past three years, did firms’ financial results have a 
primary role in wage setting? Yes (1) or No (0) 
 
 
0: 59 
1: 41 
 
 
Engagement re: 
workplace 
change 
(Only for establishments where an important change occurred during 
the past three years, reducing the sample from 2904 to 2287) 
Dummy variable where 1= a score of 5 or more from the count across 
the 7 items below, 0 otherwise: 
Considering the most important change in your establishment 
(important growth or reduction in staff, technological change or the 
launching of a new product, for example), did you discuss before this 
change took place: 
 
0: 71 
1: 29 
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1. individually, with each employee directly concerned? Yes (1) 
or No (0) 
2. at the working unit level? Yes (1) or No (0) 
3. collectively, with all the employees concerned? Yes (1) or No 
(0) 
4. with some or all of the worker representatives? Yes (1) or No 
(0) 
What was the objective of those discussions: 
5. to consult? Yes (1) or No (0) 
6. to negotiate the mode of implementing the change? Yes (2) or 
No (0) 
7. to negotiate the principle of the change? Yes (3) or No (0) 
 
Engagement re: 
targets 
(Only for establishments where targets are set, reducing the sample 
from 2904 to 2679) 
Did you negotiate the targets set in your establishment (concerning 
profitability, growth, budget constraint, wage bill, quality or security) 
with worker representatives?  
Dummy variable where 1 = yes, 0 otherwise 
 
0: 87 
1: 13 
 
 
